We consider a health care system consisting of two noncooperative parties: a health purchaser (payer) and a health provider, where the interaction between the two parties is governed by a payment contract. We determine the contracts that coordinate the health purchaser–health provider...

The paper presents a model of educational production which tries to make sense of recent evidence on effects of institutional arrangements on student performance. In a simple principal-agent framework, students choose their learning effort to maximize their net benefits, while the government...

The paper presents a model of educational production which tries to make sense of recent evidence on effects of institutional arrangements on student performance. In a simple principal-agent framework, students choose their learning effort to maximize their net benefits, while the government...

A principal can bring litigation against an agent for overstating the realized production costs. The lawsuit functions much like an audit; the principal's ability to bring suit against the agent can reduce the information rent and increase production efficiency by penalizing the agent...

 The objective of this paper is to develop an optimal incentive system for multitaskingscientists in universities or professors under repeat contracting. With the aid of a principalagentmodel under repeat contracting, we show that (i) when a second task is assigned to aprofessor and the two...

 The USDA is attempting to shift more research funds into competitive grants involving collaboration across disciplines on large projects. This type of research structure raises a host of information and incentive issues. The objective of this paper is to shed new light on principal-agent...

We analyze a long-term contracting problem involving common uncertainty about a parameter capturing the productivity of the relationship, and featuring a hidden action for the agent. We develop an approach that works for any utility function when the parameter and noise are normally distributed...

The paper presents a model of educational production which tries to make sense of recent evidence on effects of institutional arrangements on student performance. In a simple principal-agent framework, students choose their learning effort to maximize their net benefits, while the government...