Search Results - subject:"principal agent problem"

A Trickle-Down Theory of Incentives with Applications to Privatization and Outsourcing

Andersson, Fredrik - 2009

The make-or-buy decision is analyzed in a three-layer principal-management-agent model. There is a cost-saving/quality tradeoff in effort provision. The principal chooses between employing an in-house management and contracting with an independent management; the cost-saving incentives facing...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010320245

Incentives for Experimenting Agents

Horner, Johannes; Samuelson, Larry - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2009

We examine a repeated interaction between an agent, who undertakes experiments, and a principal who provides the requisite funding for these experiments. The repeated interaction gives rise to a dynamic agency cost—the more lucrative is the agent’s stream of future rents following a failure,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011265334

Incentives for Experimenting Agents

Horner, Johannes; Samuelson, Larry - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2009

We examine a repeated interaction between an agent, who undertakes experiments, and a principal who provides the requisite funding for these experiments. The repeated interaction gives rise to a dynamic agency cost — the more lucrative is the agent’s stream of future rents following a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010895676

Incentives for Experimenting Agents

Horner, Johannes; Samuelson, Larry - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2009

We examine a repeated interaction between an agent, who undertakes experiments, and a principal who provides the requisite funding for these experiments. The agent's actions are hidden, and the principal, who makes the offers, cannot commit to future actions. We identify the unique Markovian...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005064218

A Trickle-Down Theory of Incentives with Applications to Privatization and Outsourcing

Andersson, Fredrik - Institutet för Näringslivsforskning (IFN) - 2009

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005645337

Incentives for Experimenting Agents

Horner, Johannes; Samuelson, Larry - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2009

We examine a repeated interaction between an agent, who undertakes experiments, and a principal who provides the requisite funding for these experiments. The agent’s actions are hidden, and the principal cannot commit to future actions. The repeated interaction gives rise to a dynamic agency...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009645612

Dynamic Contracting with Persistent Shocks

Zhang, Yuzhe - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2009

In this paper, we develop continuous-time methods for solving dynamic principal-agent problems in which the agent's privately observed productivity shocks are persistent over time. We characterize the optimal contract as the solution to a system of ordinary differential equations and show that,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008568350

Can coase govern the Green Bay Packers?

Chen, Jia-Yuh; Khadka, Manish - In: Managerial Finance 41 (2015) 3, pp. 328-342

Purpose – The agency problem inherent in governing public corporations predicts a management not acting in shareholders’ best interest. The purpose of this paper is to use the Green Bay Packers’ unique ownership structure as a case study to show that a disperse shareholder base does not...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014941952

National Hockey League guaranteed contracts : A principal agent problem impacting on performance

Landry, Jon; Edgar, David; Harris, John; Grant, Kevin - In: Management Research Review 38 (2015) 12, pp. 1306-1330

Purpose – This paper aims to investigate, through the lens of the principal–agent problem, the relationship between … comprehensive and current perspective of the principal–agent problem in NHL and extends the work of Purcell (2009) and Gannon (2009 … – This paper quantifies potential inefficiencies of NHL league contracts and defines the parameters of the principal–agent …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014952606

Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer

Edmans, Alex; Gabaix, Xavier - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015

This article studies traditional and modern theories of executive compensation, bringing them together under a unifying framework. We analyze assignment models of the level of pay, and static and dynamic moral hazard models of incentives, and compare their predictions to empirical findings. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011272716