The standard method when analyzing the problem of cooperation using evolutionary game theory is to assume that people are randomly matched against each other in repeated games. In this paper we discuss the implications of allowing agents to have preferences over possible opponents. We model...

There are three prominent solutions to the Darwinian problem of altruism, kin selection, reciprocal altruism, and trait group selection. Only one, reciprocal altruism, most commonly implemented in game theory as a TIT FOR TAT strategy, is not based on the principle of conditional association. On...

The institution of property rights is increasingly recognized as an essential building block of an economically prosperous society. The question that remains unsolved, however, is how do we develop effective property rights institutions? The literature dealing with the development of property...

This paper derives an equilibrium for a competitive multi-stage game in which an agents' current action influences his probability of survival into the next round of play. This is directly relevant in banking, where a banks' current lending and pricing decisions determines its future probability...

We analyze one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma decisions made by participants of the high-stakes TV game show The Manipulation, and document the influence of social life factors on economic decisions, alongside the participants’ rational considerations. In particular, we employ a social psychology...

The evolution of cooperation has been the focus of intense research in the social sciences, natural sciences (especially biology), and even computer science. It has long been recognized that the possibility of future consequences is crucial to the emergence of rational cooperation. It was...