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  • Search: subject:"private infrmation"
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Year of publication
Subject
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Subjective performance evaluation 3 leniency 3 private infrmation 3 supervisor 3 Agency theory 1 Coaching 1 Contract 1 Contract theory 1 Employee appraisal 1 Leistungsanreiz 1 Performance incentive 1 Personalbeurteilung 1 Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie 1 Privatisierung 1 Privatization 1 Vertrag 1 Vertragstheorie 1
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Online availability
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Free 3
Type of publication
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Book / Working Paper 3
Type of publication (narrower categories)
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Working Paper 2 Arbeitspapier 1 Graue Literatur 1 Non-commercial literature 1
Language
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English 2 Undetermined 1
Author
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Giebe, Thomas 3 Gürtler, Oliver 3
Institution
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Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München 1
Published in...
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Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 1 Discussion papers / Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 1 SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper 1
Source
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ECONIS (ZBW) 1 EconStor 1 RePEc 1
Showing 1 - 3 of 3
Did you mean: subject:"private information" (23,166 results)
Cover Image
Optimal Contracts for Lenient Supervisors
Giebe, Thomas; Gürtler, Oliver - 2008
We consider a situation where an agent's effort is monitored by a supervisor who cares for the agent's well being. This is modeled by incorporating the agent's utility into the utility function of the supervisor. The first best solution can be implemented even if the supervisor's preferences are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334057
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Cover Image
Optimal Contracts for Lenient Supervisors
Giebe, Thomas; Gürtler, Oliver - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2008
We consider a situation where an agent's effort is monitored by a supervisor who cares for the agent's well being. This is modeled by incorporating the agent's utility into the utility function of the supervisor. The first best solution can be implemented even if the supervisor's preferences are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005739701
Saved in:
Cover Image
Optimal contracts for lenient supervisors
Giebe, Thomas; Gürtler, Oliver - 2008
We consider a situation where an agent's effort is monitored by a supervisor who cares for the agent's well being. This is modeled by incorporating the agent's utility into the utility function of the supervisor. The first best solution can be implemented even if the supervisor's preferences are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010365849
Saved in:
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