Search Results - subject:"provision of public projects"

Constitutional Design: Separation of Financing and Project Decision

Gersbach, Hans; Hahn, Volker; Imhof, Stephan - 2009

We examine the provision of public projects under separate tax and subsidy rules. We find that tax rules separated from …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011753173

Constitutional design : separation of financing and project decision

Gersbach, Hans; Hahn, Volker; Imhof, Stephan - 2009 - This version: May 2009

We examine the provision of public projects under separate tax and subsidy rules. We find that tax rules separated from …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008732396

Tax Rules

Gersbach, Hans; Hahn, Volker; Imhof, Stephan - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

We examine the provision of public projects under tax and subsidy rules. We find that tax rules separated from project …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008468549

Flexible Majority Rules

Erlenmaier, Ulrich; Gersbach, Hans - 2001

by the agenda setter. Flexible majority rules can mitigate the disadvantages of democracies in the provision of public … projects. In many cases, the combination of the principles taxation constraint to majority winners, a ban on subsidies, costly …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010315195

Flexible Majority Rules

Erlenmaier, Ulrich; Gersbach, Hans - CESifo - 2001

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005406288

Flexible majority rules

Erlenmaier, Ulrich; Gersbach, Hans - 2001

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011398428

Constitutional Design: Separation of Financing and Project Decision

Gersbach, Hans; Hahn, Volker; Imhof, Stephan - CER-ETH Center of Economic Research, Department of … - 2009

We examine the provision of public projects under separate tax and subsidy rules. We find that tax rules separated from …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005000031

Bundling and the Unanimity Rule

Erlenmaier, Ulrich; Gersbach, Hans - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

In this Paper, we design democratic constitutions that can transcend the shortcomings of the unanimity rule. The constitution embeds the unanimity rule in a set of virtue-supporting principles: (a) broad packages with many public projects (bundling) are allowed, but can only be proposed once in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791780

Unanimity Rule Constitutions

Gersbach, Hans; Erlenmaier, Ulrich - EconWPA - 2000

In this paper, we show that the shortcomings of the unanimity rule can be alleviated by complementing it with the following constitutional principles: broad packages with many public projects can only be proposed once in a legislative term, the agenda setter needs to pay the highest taxes he is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005412479