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  • Search: subject:"q-rules"
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Year of publication
Subject
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q-rules 2 Abstimmungsregel 1 Condorcet consistency 1 Condorcet stability 1 Constitutional design 1 Constitutional economics 1 Decision 1 Entscheidung 1 Erwartungsnutzen 1 Expected utility 1 Majority decisiveness 1 Neue politische Ökonomie 1 Nutzen 1 Public choice 1 Risiko 1 Risk 1 The Borda rule 1 Theorie 1 Theory 1 Utility 1 Verfassungsökonomik 1 Voting rule 1 core 1 k-Majority rules 1 q-Rules 1 spatial voting 1
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Undetermined 2
Type of publication
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Article 2 Book / Working Paper 1
Type of publication (narrower categories)
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Article in journal 1 Aufsatz in Zeitschrift 1
Language
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Undetermined 2 English 1
Author
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Baharad, Eyal 1 Dougherty, Keith L. 1 Nitzan, Shmuel 1 Ragan, Robi 1 Saari, Donald G. 1
Institution
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EconWPA 1
Published in...
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Constitutional political economy 1 Economic Theory 1 Public Economics 1
Source
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RePEc 2 ECONIS (ZBW) 1
Showing 1 - 3 of 3
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An expected utility analysis of k-majority rules
Dougherty, Keith L.; Ragan, Robi - In: Constitutional political economy 27 (2016) 3, pp. 332-353
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011776362
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The Borda rule, Condorcet consistency and Condorcet stability
Baharad, Eyal; Nitzan, Shmuel - In: Economic Theory 22 (2003) 3, pp. 685-688
The Borda rule is known to be the least vulnerable scoring rule to Condorcet inconsistency, Saari (2000). Such inconsistency occurs when the Condorcet winner (the alternative which is preferred to any other alternative by a simple majority) is not selected by the Borda rule. This note exposes...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005597798
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The Generic Existence of a Core for q-Rules
Saari, Donald G. - EconWPA - 1995
A q-rule is where a winning coalition has q or more of the n voters. An important issue is to understand when, generically, core points exist; that is, to determine when the core exists in other than highly contrived settings. As known, the answer depends upon the dimension of issue space....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005556932
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