EconBiz - Find Economic Literature
    • Logout
    • Change account settings
  • A-Z
  • Beta
  • About EconBiz
  • News
  • Thesaurus (STW)
  • Academic Skills
  • Help
  •  My account 
    • Logout
    • Change account settings
  • Login
EconBiz - Find Economic Literature
Publications Events
Search options
Advanced Search history
My EconBiz
Favorites Loans Reservations Fines
    You are here:
  • Home
  • Search: subject:"quasi-rent appropriation"
Narrow search

Narrow search

Year of publication
Subject
All
incentives compatibility 3 incentives contract 3 quasi-rent appropriation 3 retrievability 3 Agency theory 1 Anreiz 1 Incentives 1 Leistungsanreiz 1 Performance incentive 1 Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie 1 Theorie 1 Theory 1
more ... less ...
Online availability
All
Free 3
Type of publication
All
Book / Working Paper 3
Type of publication (narrower categories)
All
Working Paper 2 Arbeitspapier 1 Graue Literatur 1 Non-commercial literature 1
Language
All
English 2 Undetermined 1
Author
All
Fabella, Raul V. 3
Institution
All
School of Economics, University of the Philippines at Diliman 1
Published in...
All
Discussion paper / University of the Philippines, School of Economics 1 UP School of Economics Discussion Papers 1 UPSE Discussion Paper 1
Source
All
ECONIS (ZBW) 1 EconStor 1 RePEc 1
Showing 1 - 3 of 3
Cover Image
Differential delivery dates, retrievability and the incentives compatibility of contracts
Fabella, Raul V. - 2015
Differential delivery dates (D3) of contract obligations characterize most contracts in real life. D3 puts the contractor who delivers last, in the words of David Hume (1769), in "a position of advantage" because reneging on his/her obligation can be profitable. Ex-ante remedies such as Coase's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011335575
Saved in:
Cover Image
Differential Delivery Dates, Retrievability and the Incentives Compatibility of Contracts
Fabella, Raul V. - School of Economics, University of the Philippines at … - 2015
Differential delivery dates (D3) of contract obligations characterize most contracts in real life. D3 puts the contractor who delivers last, in the words of David Hume (1769), in “a position of advantage” because reneging on his/her obligation can be profitable. Ex-ante remedies such as...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011261253
Saved in:
Cover Image
Differential delivery dates, retrievability and the incentives compatibility of contracts
Fabella, Raul V. - 2015
Differential delivery dates (D3) of contract obligations characterize most contracts in real life. D3 puts the contractor who delivers last, in the words of David Hume (1769), in "a position of advantage" because reneging on his/her obligation can be profitable. Ex-ante remedies such as...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010530529
Saved in:
A service of the
zbw
  • Sitemap
  • Plain language
  • Accessibility
  • Contact us
  • Imprint
  • Privacy

Loading...