We study environments in which agents are randomly matched to play a Prisoner's Dilemma, and each player observes a few of the partner's past actions against previous opponents. We depart from the existing related literature by allowing a small fraction of the population to be commitment types....

I identify which theoretical model (random, stock–flow, or job queuing) best describes the matching mechanism in the labour market in Poland. The purpose of this work is to formulate policy recommendations aimed at increasing the number of matches. I use monthly registered unemployment data...

I identify which theoretical model (random, stock-flow, or job queuing) best describes the matching mechanism in the labour market in Poland. The purpose of this work is to formulate policy recommendations aimed at increasing the number of matches. I use monthly registered unemployment data for...

We study environments in which agents are randomly matched to play a Prisoner's Dilemma, and each player observes a few of the partner's past actions against previous opponents. We depart from the existing related literature by allowing a small fraction of the population to be commitment types....

We study stable behavior when players are randomly matched to play a game, and before the game begins each player may observe how his partner behaved in a few interactions in the past. We present a novel modeling approach and we show that strict Nash equilibria are always stable in such...