Search Results - subject:"rationalizability."

Refinements of Rationalizability for Normal-Form Games: The Main Ideas

Vannetelbosch, Vincent J. - Institut de Recherche Économique et Sociale (IRES), … - 1996

In normal-form games, rationalizability (Bernheim, 1984, Pearce, 1984) on its own fails to exclude some very … implausible strategy choices. Three main refinements of rationalizability have been proposed in the literature: cautious, perfect …, and proper rationalizability. Nevertheless, some of these refinements also fail to eliminate unreasonable outcomes and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004985137

Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium

Dekel, Eddie; Fudenberg, Drew; Levine, David K. - ESRC Centre for Economic Learning and Social Evolution …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005636460

On Rationalizable Outcomes in Private-Value First-Price Discrete Auctions

Robles, Jack; Shimoji, Makoto - Department of Economics and Related Studies, University …

In this paper, we extend the result of Dekel and Wollinsky ("Rationalizable Outcomes of Large Private-Value First-Price Discrete Auctions" Games and Economic Behavior, 2003) on rationalizable outcomes in first-price auctions. Dekel and Wollinsky show that under certain conditions, each player...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008528410

The Single-Person Decision Problem

Tadelis, Steven - Princeton University Press

concepts like dominated strategies and rationalizability. Only then does it present the subject of Nash equilibrium and its …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010681701

A Notion of Consistent Rationalizability - Between Weak and Pearce's Extensive Form Rationalizability

Xue, Licun - School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus

a generic game of perfect information. More generally, the notion of "weak extensive form rationalizability" (weak EFR …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114068

Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium

Aumann, Robert; Brandenburger, Adam - In: The Language of Game Theory:Putting Epistemics into the …

Sufficient conditions for Nash equilibrium in an n-person game are given in terms of what the players know and believe — about the game, and about each other's rationality, actions, knowledge, and beliefs. Mixed strategies are treated not as conscious randomizations, but as conjectures, on the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011206381

Admissibility in Games

Brandenburger, Adam; Friedenberg, Amanda; Keisler, H. Jerome - In: The Language of Game Theory:Putting Epistemics into the …

Suppose that each player in a game is rational, each player thinks the other players are rational, and so on. Also, suppose that rationality is taken to incorporate an admissibility requirement — that is, the avoidance of weakly dominated strategies. Which strategies can be played? We provide...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011206393

Hierarchies of Beliefs and Common Knowledge

Brandenburger, Adam; Dekel, Eddie - In: The Language of Game Theory:Putting Epistemics into the …

Game-theoretic analysis often leads to consideration of an infinite hierarchy of beliefs for each player. Harsanyi suggested that such a hierarchy of beliefs could be summarized in a single entity, called the player's type. This chapter provides an elementary construction, complementary to the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011206453

Self-Admissible Sets

Brandenburger, Adam; Friedenberg, Amanda - In: The Language of Game Theory:Putting Epistemics into the …

Best-response sets (Pearce [1984]) characterize the epistemic condition of “rationality and common belief of rationality.” When rationality incorporates a weak-dominance (admissibility) requirement, the self-admissible set (SAS) concept (Brandenburger, Friedenberg, and Keisler [2008])...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011206587

Lexicographic Probabilities and Choice Under Uncertainty

Blume, Lawrence; Brandenburger, Adam; Dekel, Eddie - In: The Language of Game Theory:Putting Epistemics into the …

Two properties of preferences and representations for choice under uncertainty which play an important role in decision theory are: (i) admissibility, the requirement that weakly dominated actions should not be chosen; and (ii) the existence of well defined conditional probabilities, that is,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011206642