Search Results - subject:"revelation principle."

Access Regulation under Asymmetric Information about Demand

Vareda, João - Autoridade de Concorrência, Government of Portugal - 2007

We study the impact of access regulation in a telecommunications market on an entrant?s decision whether to invest in a network or ask for access when the regulator cannot observe its potential demand. Since the entrant has incentives to not compete vigorously right after entry in order to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005115551

Markets Versus Governments: Political Economy of Mechanisms

Acemoglu, Daron; Golosov, Michael; Tsyvinski, Oleg - Society for Economic Dynamics - SED - 2006

We study the optimal Mirrlees taxation problem in a dynamic economy with idiosyncratic (productivity or preference) shocks. In contrast to the standard approach, which implicitly assumes that the mechanism is operated by a benevolent planner with full commitment power, we assume that any...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005069251

Optimal auctions with asymmetrically informed bidders

Bennouri, Moez; Falconieri, Sonia - In: Economic Theory 28 (2006) 3, pp. 585-602

The paper analyzes a problem of optimal auction design when the seller faces asymmetrically informed bidders. Specifically, we consider a continuum of risk-neutral uninformed bidders taking part into the auction along with n risk-averse informed bidders. The contribution of the paper is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005753296

The Biais-Martimort-Rochet equilibrium with direct mechanisms

Piaser, Gwenael - EconWPA - 2004

In this note we show that the equilibrium characterized by Biais, Martimort and Rochet (Econometrica, 78, 2000) could have been characterized by using direct mechanisms.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550918

original papers : Implementation with partial verification

Singh, Nirvikar; Wittman, Donald - In: Review of Economic Design 6 (2001) 1, pp. 63-84

revelation principle to continue to hold with partial verification. We provide economically interesting characterizations of this …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005178678

Contracting Structures for Custom Software Development: The Impacts of Informational Rents and Uncertainty on Internal Development and Outsourcing

Wang, Eric T. G.; Barron, Terry; Seidmann, Abraham - In: Management Science 43 (1997) 12, pp. 1726-1744

Custom software development projects have special informational attributes that have challenged managers for many years: they are associated with information asymmetries regarding user valuation and developer costs, relationship-specific investments, and a resulting likelihood of positive...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009208651

Contract complexity, incentives, and the value of delegation

Melumad, Nahum D. - In: Journal of economics & management strategy : JEMS 6 (1997) 2, pp. 257-289

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001335957

Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle

Bester, Helmut; Strausz, Roland

This paper extends the revelation principle to environments in which the mechanism designer cannot fully commit to the … optimal strategy for the agent. In contrast with the conventional revelation principle, however, the agent may not use this … and a single agent. Also, we indicate that the revelation principle cannot be extended to a framework with multiple agents …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005745372

Mediation in Situations of Conflict and Limited Commitment

Strausz, Roland; Mitusch, Kay

We study the reasons and conditions under which mediation is beneficial when a principal needs information from an agent to implement an action. Assuming a strong form of limited commitment, the principal may employ a mediator who gathers information and makes non--binding proposals. We show...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005168983