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  • Search: subject:"royalty design"
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Year of publication
Subject
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illegal logging 3 penalty schemes 3 royalty design 3 Charges 1 Concession 1 Economic crime 1 Forest harvest 1 Gebühr 1 Holzeinschlag 1 Konzession 1 Punishment 1 Social welfare function 1 Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion 1 Strafe 1 Theorie 1 Theory 1 Wirtschaftskriminalität 1
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Online availability
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Free 3
Type of publication
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Book / Working Paper 3
Type of publication (narrower categories)
All
Working Paper 2 Arbeitspapier 1 Graue Literatur 1 Non-commercial literature 1
Language
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English 3
Author
All
Amacher, Gregory S. 3 Koskela, Erkki 3 Ollikainen, Markku 3
Institution
All
CESifo 1
Published in...
All
CESifo Working Paper 1 CESifo Working Paper Series 1 CESifo working papers 1
Source
All
ECONIS (ZBW) 1 EconStor 1 RePEc 1
Showing 1 - 3 of 3
Cover Image
Socially Optimal Royalty Design and Illegal Logging under Alternative Penalty Schemes
Amacher, Gregory S.; Koskela, Erkki; Ollikainen, Markku - 2004
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010315907
Saved in:
Cover Image
Socially Optimal Royalty Design and Illegal Logging under Alternative Penalty Schemes
Amacher, Gregory S.; Koskela, Erkki; Ollikainen, Markku - CESifo - 2004
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005766133
Saved in:
Cover Image
Socially optimal royalty design and illegal logging under alternative penalty schemes
Amacher, Gregory S.; Koskela, Erkki; Ollikainen, Markku - 2004
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011402671
Saved in:
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