The Deferred Acceptance algorithm (DA) frequently produces Pareto inefficient allocations in school choice problems. While a number of efficient mechanisms that Pareto-dominate DA are available, a normative question remains unexplored: which students should benefit from efficiency enhancements?...

The Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism can generate inefficient placements. Although Pareto-dominant mechanisms exist, it remains unclear which and how many students could improve their DA assignment. We characterize the set of unimprovable students and show that it includes those unassigned or...

Over sixty years following Brown vs. Board of Education, racial and socioeconomic segregation and lack of equal access to educational opportunities persist. Across the country, voluntary desegregation busing programs aim to ameliorate these imbalances and disparities. A longstanding...

Though the use of tracking policies to stratify students is commonplace, evi- dence concerning the effects of ability-based tracking on student performance is mixed. Using rich data from the Hungarian secondary school centralized assignment mechanism and a quasi-experimental framework, we find...

We partner with Ecuador's government to implement a centralized school choice system using a Deferred Acceptance algorithm in Manta. Our study evaluates the welfare impact of transitioning from a distance-based assignment system to one that incorporates families' preferences. Results show that...