Search Results - subject:"sequential communication equilibrium"

Makris, Miltiadis; Renou, Ludovic - In: Theoretical Economics 18 (2023) 4, pp. 1475-1509

This paper generalizes the concept of Bayes correlated equilibrium (Bergemann and Morris, 2016) to multi-stage games. We apply our characterization results to a number of illustrative examples and applications.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014537039

Information design in multistage games

Makrēs, Miltiadēs; Renou, Ludovic - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 18 (2023) 4, pp. 1475-1509

This paper generalizes the concept of Bayes' correlated equilibrium Bergemann and Morris (2016) to multistage games. We apply our characterization results to a number of illustrative examples and applications.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014440070

Information design in multi-stage games

Makris, Miltiadis; Renou, Ludovic - 2018

obtain in any (sequential) communication equilibrium of any expansion of multi-stage games, i.e., when players can receive …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012144205

Information design in multi-stage games

Makrēs, Miltiadēs; Renou, Ludovic - 2018

obtain in any (sequential) communication equilibrium of any expansion of multi-stage games, i.e., when players can receive …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011872424

Sequential Equilibria in Bayesian Games with Communication

Gerardi, Dino; Myerson, Roger B. - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2005

communication equilibrium (SCE) defined by Myerson (1986) in that SCE allows the possibility of trembles by the mediator. We show … define the set of strong sequential equilibria (SSCE) and characterize it. SSCE differs from the concept of sequential …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762852