In cooperative games, the coalition structure core is, despite its potential emptiness, one of the most popular solutions. While it is a fundamentally static concept, the consideration of a sequential extension of the underlying dominance correspondence gave rise to a selection of non-empty...

In cooperative games, the coalition structure core is, despite its potential emptiness, one of the most popular solutions. While it is a fundamentally static concept, the consideration of a sequential extension of the underlying dominance correspondence gave rise to a selection of non-empty...

The 2003–2011 period in Ireland can be viewed as a roller-coaster with years of high growth followed by years of deep recession. This paper reviews developments in income and health poverty in Ireland over that period using data from the survey of income and living conditions. Income and...

Poverty evaluations differ from welfare evaluations in one significant aspect, the existence of a threshold or reference point, the poverty line. It is therefore possible to build up normative evaluation models in which comparisons are made taking distances from this reference point and not only...

A well-known criterion to make heterogeneous welfare comparisons is Atkinson and Bourguignon’s (1987) sequential generalized Lorenz dominance (SGLD) criterion. Recently, Fleurbaey, Hagneré and Trannoy (2003) convincingly argue that it contains unreasonable household utility profiles and...