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  • Search: subject:"signaling and screening models"
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Year of publication
Subject
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intrinsic motivation 7 monetary incentive schemes 7 signaling and screening models 7 Leistungsanreiz 3 Leistungsmotivation 3 Mindestlohn 3 Signalling 3 Verhandlungstheorie 3 minimum wage 3 minimum wages 3 wage posting 3 worker selection 3 Bargaining theory 2 Minimum wage 2 Performance incentive 2 Theorie 2 Work motivation 2 Agency theory 1 Anreizvertrag 1 Motivation 1 Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie 1 Theory 1 minimum wages. 1
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Online availability
All
Free 7
Type of publication
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Book / Working Paper 7
Type of publication (narrower categories)
All
Working Paper 4 Arbeitspapier 2 Graue Literatur 2 Non-commercial literature 2
Language
All
English 5 Undetermined 2
Author
All
Delfgaauw, Josse 7 Dur, Robert A.J. 3 Dur, Robert 2 Dur, Robert A. J. 2
Institution
All
CESifo 1 Tinbergen Institute 1 Tinbergen Instituut 1
Published in...
All
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 2 CESifo Working Paper 1 CESifo Working Paper Series 1 CESifo working papers 1 Discussion paper / Tinbergen Institute 1 Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 1
Source
All
RePEc 3 ECONIS (ZBW) 2 EconStor 2
Showing 1 - 7 of 7
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Signaling and screening of workers' motivation
Delfgaauw, Josse; Dur, Robert A. J. - 2005 - Rev.
This paper develops a model in which workers are heterogeneous in their intrinsic motivation to work at a firm. We characterise optimal incentive schemes and examine how the firm can attract and select highly motivated workers to fill a vacancy when workers’ motivation is private information....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011326939
Saved in:
Cover Image
Signaling and Screening of Workers' motivation
Delfgaauw, Josse; Dur, Robert - 2003
This paper develops a model in which workers to a certain extent enjoy working. We examine the implications of workers' intrinsic motivation for optimal monetary incentive schemes. We show that motivated workers work harder and, for a given level of e.ort, are willing to work for a lower wage....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010315874
Saved in:
Cover Image
Signaling and Screening of Workers' motivation
Delfgaauw, Josse; Dur, Robert - CESifo - 2003
This paper develops a model in which workers to a certain extent enjoy working. We examine the implications of workers’ intrinsic motivation for optimal monetary incentive schemes. We show that motivated workers work harder and, for a given level of e.ort, are willing to work for a lower wage....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005765895
Saved in:
Cover Image
Signaling and screening of workers' motivation
Delfgaauw, Josse; Dur, Robert A. J. - 2003
This paper develops a model in which workers to a certain extent enjoy working. We examine the implications of workers intrinsic motivation for optimal monetary incentive schemes. We show that motivated workers work harder and, for a given level of e.ort, are willing to work for a lower wage....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011404324
Saved in:
Cover Image
Signaling and Screening of Workers' Motivation
Delfgaauw, Josse; Dur, Robert A.J. - 2002
This paper develops a model in which workers are heterogeneous in their intrinsic motivation to work at a firm. We characterise optimal incentive schemes and examine how the firm can attract and select highly motivated workers to fill a vacancy when workers’ motivation is private information....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010324756
Saved in:
Cover Image
Signaling and Screening of Workers' Motivation
Delfgaauw, Josse; Dur, Robert A.J. - Tinbergen Institute - 2002
This paper develops a model in which workers are heterogeneous in their intrinsic motivation to work at a firm. We characterise optimal incentive schemes and examine how the firm can attract and select highly motivated workers to fill a vacancy when workers’ motivation is private information....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005450717
Saved in:
Cover Image
Signaling and Screening of Workers' Motivation
Delfgaauw, Josse; Dur, Robert A.J. - Tinbergen Instituut - 2002
This paper develops a model in which workers are heterogeneous in their intrinsic motivation to work at a firm. We characterise optimal incentive schemes and examine how the firm can attract and select highly motivated workers to fill a vacancy when workers’ motivation is private information....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256027
Saved in:
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