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  • Search: subject:"single-valued solution"
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Year of publication
Subject
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Cooperative game 4 convexity 4 core 4 graph structure 4 single-valued solution 4 spanning tree 4 Shapley value 3 Core 2 Kommunikation 2 Kooperatives Spiel 2 TU-games 2 Theorie 2 Communication 1 Marginal contribution 1 Null player axiom 1 Shapley-Wert 1 Single valued solution 1 Theory 1 Transferable Utility Games 1 Transferable utility 1 Transferierbarer Nutzen 1 marginal contribution 1 null player axiom 1 single valued solution 1
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Online availability
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Free 5 Undetermined 1
Type of publication
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Book / Working Paper 5 Article 1
Type of publication (narrower categories)
All
Working Paper 2 Arbeitspapier 1 Graue Literatur 1 Non-commercial literature 1
Language
All
Undetermined 4 English 2
Author
All
Talman, Dolf 4 Yang, Zaifu 4 Herings, P. Jean-Jacques 3 Laan, Gerard van der 3 Chameni Nembua, C. 1 Chameni Nembua, Célestin 1 Herings, Peter Jean-Jacques 1 van der Laan, Gerard 1
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Institution
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Tinbergen Institute 1 Tinbergen Instituut 1 Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München 1
Published in...
All
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 2 Discussion paper / Tinbergen Institute 1 Games and Economic Behavior 1 MPRA Paper 1 Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 1
Source
All
RePEc 4 ECONIS (ZBW) 1 EconStor 1
Showing 1 - 6 of 6
Cover Image
The Average Tree Solution for Cooperative Games with Communication Structure
Herings, P. Jean-Jacques; van der Laan, Gerard; Talman, Dolf - 2008
able to cooperate only if they can form a network in the graph. A single-valued solution, the average tree solution, is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325870
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Cover Image
The Average Tree Solution for Cooperative Games with Communication Structure
Herings, P. Jean-Jacques; Laan, Gerard van der; Talman, Dolf - Tinbergen Institute - 2008
able to cooperate only if they can form a network in the graph. A single-valued solution, the average tree solution, is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137089
Saved in:
Cover Image
The Average Tree Solution for Cooperative Games with Communication Structure
Herings, P. Jean-Jacques; Laan, Gerard van der; Talman, Dolf - Tinbergen Instituut - 2008
if they can form a network in the graph. A single-valued solution, the average tree solution, is proposed for this class …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255465
Saved in:
Cover Image
The average tree solution for cooperative games with communication structure
Herings, Peter Jean-Jacques; Laan, Gerard van der; … - 2008
able to cooperate only if they can form a network in the graph. A single-valued solution, the average tree solution, is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011377055
Saved in:
Cover Image
Linear efficient and symmetric values for TU-games: sharing the joint gain of cooperation
Chameni Nembua, Célestin - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2010
null player axiom is also generalized and it is shown that any single valued solution satisfying the three properties is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009644152
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Cover Image
Linear efficient and symmetric values for TU-games: Sharing the joint gain of cooperation
Chameni Nembua, C. - In: Games and Economic Behavior 74 (2012) 1, pp. 431-433
Recently, Hermandez-Lamoneda et al. (2008) and independently Chameni and Andjiga (2008) gave an analytic formulation for all valued solutions to the n-person TU-games that satisfy linearity, efficiency and symmetry axioms. Our main purpose in this paper is to recast the proposed formulation to a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010597541
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