Gill and Prowse (2023) study response times using a repeated p-beauty contest (p = 0.7). Looking at between-subject variation in response times, they found that subjects who think for longer, on average, win more rounds and choose lower numbers. When comparing average response times and level-k...

Gill and Prowse (2023) study response times using a repeated p-beauty contest (p = 0.7). Looking at between-subject variation in response times, they found that subjects who think for longer, on average, win more rounds and choose lower numbers. When comparing average response times and level-k...

This paper initiates the study of long term interactions where players' bounded rationality varies over time. Time dependent bounded rationality is reflected in part in the number $\psi(t)$ of distinct strategies in the first $t$-stages. We examine how the growth rate of $\psi_i(t)$ affects...

One way to express bounded rationality of a player in a game theoretic models is by specifying a set of feasible strategies for that player. In dynamic game models with finite automata and bounded recall strategies, for example, feasibility of strategies is determined via certain complexity...

It is common to model costs of carrying out strategies in games in relation to the complexity, in some sense, of the strategies. We show a particularly general definition of complexity for this purpose, one that subsumes many alternatives as special cases. We explore how this definition can be...