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  • Search: subject:"super-symmetric rule"
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Year of publication
Subject
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pure comparative vigilance 9 super-symmetric rule 9 Nash equilibrium 7 economic efficiency 7 equity 7 social costs 7 tort liability rules 7 Comparative vigilance 4 comparative vigilance 3 Haftung 2 Theorie 2 competitive equilibrium payoff 2 lattice social costs 2 matching 2 optimal stable payoff 2 stable payoff 2
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Online availability
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Free 8 Undetermined 1
Type of publication
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Book / Working Paper 8 Article 1
Type of publication (narrower categories)
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Working Paper 2 research-article 1
Language
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English 9
Author
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Singh, Ram 7 Feldman, Allan M. 5 Feldman, Allan M 2 Sotomayor, Marilda 2
Institution
All
Brown University, Department of Economics 4 Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics 1 eSocialSciences 1
Published in...
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Working Papers / Brown University, Department of Economics 4 Working Paper 2 Asian Journal of Law and Economics 1 Working Papers / eSocialSciences 1 Working papers / Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics 1
Source
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RePEc 6 EconStor 2 Other ZBW resources 1
Showing 1 - 9 of 9
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Comparative Vigilance
Singh, Ram; Feldman, Allan M. - eSocialSciences - 2010
when both parties are vigilant, and that is always responsive to increased care. Moreover, our super-symmetric rule divides …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008460997
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Comparative vigilance: A simple guide
Feldman, Allan M.; Singh, Ram - 2008
In this paper we discuss a new tort liability rule, which we call super-symmetric comparative negligence and vigilance. When both injurer and victim in an accident are negligent, it provides for liability shares that depend on the degrees of negligence of the two parties, similar to the standard...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010284036
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Comparative vigilance
Feldman, Allan M.; Singh, Ram - 2008
A growing body of literature suggests that courts and juries are inclined toward division of liability between two strictly non-negligent or 'vigilant' parties. However, standard models of liability rules do not provide for vigilance-based sharing of liability. In this paper, we explore the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010284040
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COMPARATIVE VIGILANCE
Feldman, Allan M.; Singh, Ram - Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics - 2008
necessary for efficiency. However we develop a liability rule, which we call the “super-symmetric rule,” that is both efficient … both parties are vigilant, and that is always responsive to increased care. Moreover, our super-symmetric rule divides … liability rule, which we call the “super-symmetric rule,” that is both efficient and continuous, that is based on comparative …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005034649
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Adjusting Prices in the Many-to-many Assignment Game
Sotomayor, Marilda - Brown University, Department of Economics - 2008
Starting with an initial price vector, prices are adjusted in order to eliminate the demand excess and at the same time to keep the transfers to the sellers as low as possible. In each step of the auction, to which sellers should those transfers be made (minimal overdemanded sets) is the key...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005092429
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Cover Image
Comparative Vigilance: a Simple Guide
Feldman, Allan M; Singh, Ram - Brown University, Department of Economics - 2008
In this paper we discuss a new tort liability rule, which we call super-symmetric comparative negligence and vigilance. When both injurer and victim in an accident are negligent, it provides for liability shares that depend on the degrees of negligence of the two parties, similar to the standard...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005249423
Saved in:
Cover Image
Adjusting Prices in the Many-to-many Assignment Game
Sotomayor, Marilda - Brown University, Department of Economics - 2008
Starting with an initial price vector, prices are adjusted in order to eliminate the demand excess and at the same time to keep the transfers to the sellers as low as possible. In each step of the auction, to which sellers should those transfers be made (minimal overdemanded sets) is the key...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005181179
Saved in:
Cover Image
Comparative Vigilance
Feldman, Allan M; Singh, Ram - Brown University, Department of Economics - 2008
A growing body of literature suggests that courts and juries are inclined toward division of liability between two strictly non-negligent or “vigilant” parties. However, standard models of liability rules do not provide for vigilance-based sharing of liability. In this paper, we explore the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005181195
Saved in:
Cover Image
A Simple Guide to Comparative Vigilance
Feldman, Allan M.; Singh, Ram - In: Asian Journal of Law and Economics 2 (2011) 3
In this paper we discuss a new tort liability rule, which we call super-symmetric comparative negligence and vigilance. When both injurer and victim in an accident are negligent, it provides for liability shares that depend on the degrees of negligence of the two parties, similar to the standard...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014585287
Saved in:
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