We analyze a two-period licensing game in which a non-producer upstream patent holder licenses an innovation to either one or two downstream licensees for a payment based on the licensee’s expected per-period profit. Licensees have private information about the innovation’s value, and their...

This study is about the interactions between GDI and government under political pressure, in a context with an agency relationship and the existence of relevant information. In particular, interactions are studied when the agency relationship is with symmetric information and it is build a...

We analyze the dynamics of the (non-drastic) patents which last for several periods when its owner is asymmetrically informed in relation to their users. These learn -by using the patent- its cost characteristics, and there is symmetric information among the users. In this setting, we show that...

The aim of this paper is to study the (non-drastic) patent dynamics when their users have private information with respect to the patent owner and the rival users. We found that, together with the sampling effect and the dissipation effect, an informational effect appears and, as a consequence,...