It has been argued in the literature that privatized airports would charge more efficient congestion prices and would be more responsive to market incentives for capacity expansions. Furthermore, privatized airports would not need to be regulated since price elasticities are low, so allocative...

We use data from over 20,000 firms in 60 countries to identify constraints on the growth of firms. We interpret managers' answers to survey questions on the extent to which various aspects of their external environment inhibit the performance of their firm as measuring the shadow cost of...

The goal of this paper is to bring some unity to the theoretical side of the debate on internalization of airport congestion by showing that all the literature's theoretical results can be derived within one simple and unified framework. The analysis starts by replicating the results of...

The paper discusses the case against a laissez faire approach to resource allocation and develops a model of supply bottlenecks. It argues that: (1) once budget constraints are hardened and credit markets begin to function appropriately, externalities associated with production bottlenecks and...

Congestion has become a problem for many airports throughout the world. Two different policy options to control congestion are analyzed in this paper: slot constraints and congestion pricing. In particular, our model takes into account that the airline industry is characterized by significant...

We analyze within a dynamic model how firms decide on capital investment if the accompanying adjustment costs are a function of governmental activity. The government provides a public input and decides on the degree of rivalry. The productive public input enhances private capital productivity...

In the EU telecommunications regulatory framework a strong intention to avoid overregulation with respect to new markets can be observed. However, a clear-cut economically based analysis of the remaining need for sector-specific regu-lation is still missing. In this paper, the question is...