We study discretionary equilibrium in the Calvo pricing model for a monetary authority that chooses the money supply, producing three main contributions. First, price-adjusting firms have a unique equilibrium price for a broad range of parameterizations, in contrast to earlier results for the...

We study discretionary equilibrium in the Calvo pricing model for a monetary authority that chooses the money supply, producing three main contributions. First, price‐adjusting firms have a unique equilibrium price for a broad range of parameterizations, in contrast to earlier results for the...

We build an infinite horizon equilibrium model of fiscal federation, where anticipation of transfers from the central government creates incentives for local governments to overborrow. Absent commitment, the central government over-transfers, which distorts the central-local distribution of...

We build an infinite horizon equilibrium model of fiscal federation, where anticipation of transfers from the central government creates incentives for local governments to overborrow. Absent commitment, the central government over-transfers, which distorts the central-local distribution of...