Search Results - subject:"tort liability rules"

Singh, Ram; Feldman, Allan M. - eSocialSciences - 2010

A growing body of literature suggests that courts and juries are inclined toward division of liability between two strictly non-negligent or â€œvigilantâ€ parties. However, standard models of liability rules do not provide for vigilance-based sharing of liability. In this paper, we...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008460997

Comparative vigilance: A simple guide

Feldman, Allan M.; Singh, Ram - 2008

In this paper we discuss a new tort liability rule, which we call super-symmetric comparative negligence and vigilance. When both injurer and victim in an accident are negligent, it provides for liability shares that depend on the degrees of negligence of the two parties, similar to the standard...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010284036

Comparative vigilance

Feldman, Allan M.; Singh, Ram - 2008

A growing body of literature suggests that courts and juries are inclined toward division of liability between two strictly non-negligent or 'vigilant' parties. However, standard models of liability rules do not provide for vigilance-based sharing of liability. In this paper, we explore the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010284040

COMPARATIVE VIGILANCE

Feldman, Allan M.; Singh, Ram - Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics - 2008

. 1 INTRODUCTION Tort liability rules determine how accident losses are distributed among the parties involved. The …-symmetric rule has one more feature that sets it off: Standard tort liability rules allocate total expected accident costs between … liability rules, Nash equilibrium, social costs, pure comparative vigilance, super-symmetric rule JEL classification: K13, D61 …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005034649

Comparative Vigilance: a Simple Guide

Feldman, Allan M; Singh, Ram - Brown University, Department of Economics - 2008

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005249423

Comparative Vigilance

Feldman, Allan M; Singh, Ram - Brown University, Department of Economics - 2008

A growing body of literature suggests that courts and juries are inclined toward division of liability between two strictly non-negligent or “vigilant” parties. However, standard models of liability rules do not provide for vigilance-based sharing of liability. In this paper, we explore the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005181195