strategies. We prove that for each stable mechanism, truncation strategies are exhaustive for each agent with quota (Theorem 1 … in simple preference manipulations that have been reported and studied in empirical and theoretical work: truncation … strategies, which are the lists obtained by removing a tail of least preferred partners from a preference list, and the more …

strategies. We prove that for each stable mechanism, truncation strategies are exhaustive for each agent with quota 1 (Theorem 1 … in simple preference manipulations that have been reported and studied in empirical and theoretical work: truncation … strategies, which are the lists obtained by removing a tail of least preferred partners from a preference list, and the more …

in simple preference manipulations that have been reported and studied in empirical and theoretical work: truncation … strategies, which are the lists obtained by removing a tail of least preferred partners from a preference list, and the more … of the market (Theorem 1), i.e., independently of the quotas. Then, we show that for each stable mechanism, truncation …