Search Results - subject:"uncoupled dynamics"

Communication complexity of approximate Nash equilibria

Babichenko, Yakov; Rubinstein, Aviad - In: Games and economic behavior 134 (2022), pp. 376-398

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013341484

Completely uncoupled dynamics and Nash equilibria

Babichenko, Yakov - In: Games and Economic Behavior 76 (2012) 1, pp. 1-14

Completely uncoupled dynamics are a repeated play of a game, where every period each player knows only his own action … equilibria. Second, the above result does not hold for Nash ε-equilibrium: we exhibit completely uncoupled dynamics that lead to … and payoffs. The main contributions of the present paper are the following. First, there exist no completely uncoupled …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049865

Global Nash convergence of Foster and Young's regret testing

Germano, Fabrizio; Lugosi, Gábor - Department of Economics and Business, Universitat … - 2004

We construct an uncoupled randomized strategy of repeated play such that, if every player follows such a strategy, then the joint mixed strategy profiles converge, almost surely, to a Nash equilibrium of the one-shot game. The procedure requires very little in terms of players' information about...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005772425

Simple Adaptive Strategies:From Regret-Matching to Uncoupled Dynamics

Hart, Sergiu; Mas-Colell, Andreu - World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.

Dynamics: <ul> <li>Uncoupled Dynamics Do Not Lead to Nash Equilibrium (Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas …-Colell)</li> <li>Stochastic Uncoupled Dynamics and Nash Equilibrium (Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell)</li> <li … Mas-Colell)</li> <li>General Procedures Leading to Correlated Equilibria (Amotz Cahn)</li> </ul> </li> <li>Uncoupled …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011156379

ADAPTIVE HEURISTICS

Hart, Sergiu - In: Simple Adaptive Strategies:From Regret-Matching to …

AbstractWe exhibit a large class of simple rules of behavior, which we call adaptive heuristics, and show that they generate rational behavior in the long run. These adaptive heuristics are based on natural regret measures, and may be viewed as a bridge between rational and behavioral...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011206382

GENERAL PROCEDURES LEADING TO CORRELATED EQUILIBRIA

Cahn, Amotz - In: Simple Adaptive Strategies:From Regret-Matching to …

AbstractHart and Mas-Colell (2000) show that if all players play “regret matching” strategies, i.e., they play with probabilities proportional to the regrets, then the empirical distribution of play converges to the set of correlated equilibria, and the regrets of every player converge to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011206392

HOW LONG TO EQUILIBRIUM? THE COMMUNICATION COMPLEXITY OF UNCOUPLED EQUILIBRIUM PROCEDURES

Hart, Sergiu; Mansour, Yishay - In: Simple Adaptive Strategies:From Regret-Matching to …

AbstractWe study the question of how long it takes players to reach a Nash equilibrium in uncoupled setups, where each player initially knows only his own payoff function. We derive lower bounds on the communication complexity of reaching a Nash equilibrium, i.e., on the number of bits that need...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011206487

NASH EQUILIBRIUM AND DYNAMICS

Hart, Sergiu - In: Simple Adaptive Strategies:From Regret-Matching to …

AbstractJohn F. Nash, Jr., submitted his Ph. D. dissertation entitled Non-Cooperative Games to Princeton University in 1950. Read it 58 years later, and you will find the germs of various later developments in game theory. Some of these are presented below, followed by a discussion of dynamic...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011206644

EXISTENCE OF CORRELATED EQUILIBRIA

Hart, Sergiu; Schmeidler, David - In: Simple Adaptive Strategies:From Regret-Matching to …

AbstractAn elementary proof, based on linear duality, is provided for the existence of correlated equilibria in finite games. The existence result is then extended to infinite games, including some that possess no Nash equilibria.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011206692

UNCOUPLED AUTOMATA AND PURE NASH EQUILIBRIA

Babichenko, Yakov - In: Simple Adaptive Strategies:From Regret-Matching to …

AbstractWe study the problem of reaching a pure Nash equilibrium in multi-person games that are repeatedly played under the assumption of uncoupledness: every player knows only his own payoff function. We consider strategies that can be implemented by finite-state automata, and characterize the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011206747