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  • Search: subject:"unique equilibria"
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Year of publication
Subject
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unique equilibria 3 binary decisions 2 free riding 2 Abstimmungsregel 1 Current crisis 1 Decision 1 Electoral system 1 Entscheidung 1 Free rider problem 1 Game theory 1 Neue politische Ökonomie 1 Public choice 1 Spieltheorie 1 Trittbrettfahrerverhalten 1 Voting 1 Voting behaviour 1 Voting rule 1 Wahlsystem 1 Wahlverhalten 1 capacity 1 global games 1 non additive product measure 1 voting 1
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Online availability
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Free 2 Undetermined 1
Type of publication
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Book / Working Paper 2 Article 1
Type of publication (narrower categories)
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Working Paper 2 Arbeitspapier 1 Graue Literatur 1 Non-commercial literature 1
Language
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English 2 Undetermined 1
Author
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Bolle, Friedel 2 BAUER, CHRISTIAN 1
Published in...
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Discussion Paper 1 Discussion papers / Europa-Universität Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder), Fakultät Wirtschaftswissenschaften 1 International Game Theory Review (IGTR) 1
Source
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ECONIS (ZBW) 1 EconStor 1 RePEc 1
Showing 1 - 3 of 3
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Simultaneous and sequential voting under general decision rules
Bolle, Friedel - 2017
In an economic theory of voting, voters have positive or negative costs of voting in favor of a proposal and positive or negative benefits from an accepted proposal. When votes have equal weight then simultaneous voting mostly has a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium which is independent of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011629791
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Cover Image
Simultaneous and sequential voting under general decision rules
Bolle, Friedel - 2017
In an economic theory of voting, voters have positive or negative costs of voting in favor of a proposal and positive or negative benefits from an accepted proposal. When votes have equal weight then simultaneous voting mostly has a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium which is independent of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011630502
Saved in:
Cover Image
SOLUTION UNIQUENESS IN A CLASS OF CURRENCY CRISIS GAMES
BAUER, CHRISTIAN - In: International Game Theory Review (IGTR) 07 (2005) 04, pp. 531-543
. We show that the concept of Choquet expected utility maximization under Knightian uncertainty leads to unique equilibria …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005047549
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