EconBiz - Find Economic Literature
    • Logout
    • Change account settings
  • A-Z
  • Beta
  • About EconBiz
  • News
  • Thesaurus (STW)
  • Academic Skills
  • Help
  •  My account 
    • Logout
    • Change account settings
  • Login
EconBiz - Find Economic Literature
Publications Events
Search options
Advanced Search history
My EconBiz
Favorites Loans Reservations Fines
    You are here:
  • Home
  • Search: subject:"unobservable misbehavior"
Narrow search

Narrow search

Year of publication
Subject
All
deterrence 3 doping 3 monitoring 3 unobservable misbehavior 3 victimless crime 3 law & economics 2 Crime 1 Economics of crime 1 Kriminalität 1 Kriminalitätsökonomik 1 Law enforcement 1 Punishment 1 Rechtsdurchsetzung 1 Strafe 1 Theorie 1 Theory 1 economics 1 law 1
more ... less ...
Online availability
All
Free 3
Type of publication
All
Book / Working Paper 3
Type of publication (narrower categories)
All
Working Paper 2 Arbeitspapier 1 Graue Literatur 1 Non-commercial literature 1
Language
All
English 2 Undetermined 1
Author
All
Buechel, Berno 3 Mühlheusser, Gerd 2 Mühlheußer, Gerd 1
Institution
All
CESifo 1
Published in...
All
CESifo Working Paper 1 CESifo Working Paper Series 1 CESifo working papers 1
Source
All
ECONIS (ZBW) 1 EconStor 1 RePEc 1
Showing 1 - 3 of 3
Cover Image
Black Sheep or Scapegoats? Implementable Monitoring Policies under Unobservable Levels of Misbehavior
Buechel, Berno; Mühlheusser, Gerd - 2014
An authority delegates a monitoring task to an agent. It can only observe the number of detected offenders, but neither the monitoring intensity chosen by the agent nor the resulting level of misbehavior. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the implementability of monitoring...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010352428
Saved in:
Cover Image
Black Sheep or Scapegoats? Implementable Monitoring Policies under Unobservable Levels of Misbehavior
Buechel, Berno; Mühlheusser, Gerd - CESifo - 2014
An authority delegates a monitoring task to an agent. It can only observe the number of detected offenders, but neither the monitoring intensity chosen by the agent nor the resulting level of misbehavior. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the implementability of monitoring...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010752436
Saved in:
Cover Image
Black sheep or scapegoats? : implementable monitoring policies under unobservable levels of misbehavior
Buechel, Berno; Mühlheußer, Gerd - 2014
An authority delegates a monitoring task to an agent. It can only observe the number of detected offenders, but neither the monitoring intensity chosen by the agent nor the resulting level of misbehavior. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the implementability of monitoring...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010256706
Saved in:
A service of the
zbw
  • Sitemap
  • Plain language
  • Accessibility
  • Contact us
  • Imprint
  • Privacy

Loading...