This paper presents a model of two countries competing for a pool of students from the rest of the world (ROW). In equilibrium, one country offers high educational quality for high tuition fees, while the other country provides a low quality and charges low fees. The quality in the high quality...

The paper presents a model of two countries competing for the international pool of talented students from the rest of the world. To relax tuition-fee competition, countries differentiate their education systems in equilibrium, albeit inefficiently. One country offers high educational quality at...

The paper presents a model of two countries competing for the international pool of talented students from the rest of the world. To relax tuition-fee competition, countries differentiate their education systems in equilibrium, albeit inefficiently. One country offers high educational quality at...

This paper presents a model of two countries competing for a pool of students from the rest of the world (ROW). In equilibrium, one country offers high educational quality for high tuition fees, while the other country provides a low quality and charges low fees. The quality in the high quality...

The paper presents a model of two countries competing for the international pool of talented students from the rest of the world. To relax tuition-fee competition, countries differentiate their education systems in equilibrium. While one country offers high education quality at high charges for...

In this article, we apply a model of vertical product differentiation to the Japanese beef market. We theoretically derive a system of consumer demand functions for quality-differentiated beef in Japan. We choose a particular utility function which is nonlinear in the consumption of the...