This paper deals with the problem of calculating the Shapley-Shubik power index in weighted majority games. We propose an efficient Monte Carlo algorithm based on an implicit hierarchical structure of permutations of players. Our algorithm outputs a vector of power indices preserving the...

The Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) used by the Council of the European Union developed to a high degree of complexity from one modifying treaty to another, until the latest definition stipulated in the Treaty of Lisbon. This paper analyses this EU intra-institutional voting method using a...

Agenda-setting power is a double-edged sword that increases the likelihood that an agent is chosen to be a proposer, but may reduce the probability that the agent is included in a winning coalition. We experimentally test the theoretical prediction of potentially negative returns to...

I propose a general power index in games. The power of an agent over an outcome is understood as the equilibrium effect on the outcome of variations in the agent’s preferences. I show that the new index, ∆, has the following properties: (i) classic measures of freedom of choice are a special...