Search Results - subject:"weighted voting"

A Note on a Weighted Voting Experiment: Human Mistakes in Cooperative Games

Guerci, Eric; Hanaki, Nobuyuki; Watanabe, Naoki; … - HAL - 2011

We conducted a sensitivity analysis of results in weighted voting experiments by varying the following two features of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009372684

The paradox of new members in the EU Council of Ministers: a non-cooperative bargaining analysis

Montero, Maria - 2010

Power indices suggest that adding new members to a voting body may increase the power of an existing member, even if the number of votes of all existing members and the decision rule remain constant. This phenomenon is known as the paradox of new members. This paper uses the leading model of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010272464

Az ellenzék ereje: Általános súlyozott szavazási játékok

Kóczy, László Á.; Pintér, Péter Miklós - 2010

or not. In this paper we introduce general weighted voting games, where the value of a coalition is a random variable. We …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010494447

The Paradox of New Members in the EU Council of Ministers: A Non-cooperative Bargaining Analysis

Montero, Maria - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2010

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008674342

重み付き多数決における拒否権と投票力分布

市川, 実 - Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University - 2010

．さらに，日本の地方議会における首長の拒否権が投票力分布に与える影響を分析する．, This paper examines the effect of a veto power on the distribution of powerunder weighted voting by using the Shapley …-Shubik index (SS index). We constructa weighted voting model with veto rights parameters of McCarty(2000).The model treats not only …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008475925

The nucleolus of large majority games

Kurz, Sascha; Napel, Stefan; Nohn, Andreas - In: Economics Letters 123 (2014) 2, pp. 139-143

Members of a shareholder meeting or legislative committee have greater or smaller voting power than meets the eye if the nucleolus of the induced majority game differs from the voting weight distribution. We establish a new sufficient condition for the weight and power distributions to be equal,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010906372

The geometry of voting power: Weighted voting and hyper-ellipsoids

Houy, Nicolas; Zwicker, William S. - In: Games and Economic Behavior 84 (2014) C, pp. 7-16

that each legislator has over collective decisions. We provide three new characterizations of weighted voting that embody …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010753430

Global coordination : weighted voting

Lane, Jan-Erik - In: Brazilian journal of political economy 34 (2014) 1, pp. 72-79

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015168105

The nucleolus of large majority games

Kurz, Sascha; Napel, Stefan; Nohn, Andreas - In: Economics letters 123 (2014) 2, pp. 139-143

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010399869

The geometry of voting power : weighted voting and hyper-ellipsoids

Houy, Nicolas; Zwicker, William S. - In: Games and economic behavior 84 (2014), pp. 7-16

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010481253