Search Results - subject:"winners€™s curse"

The more the merrier? Number of bidders, information dispersion, renegotiation and winner’s curse in toll road concessions

Athias, Laure; Nunez, Antonio - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2008

We empirically assess the winner’s curse effect in auctions for toll road concessions. First, we investigate the … overall winner’s curse effects on bidding behaviour. Second, we account for differing levels of common-value components. Third …, we investigate whether the possibility of renegotiation affects the winner’s curse effect. Using a unique dataset of 49 …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005059108

Valuation structure in first-price and least-revenue auctions: an experimental investigation

Aycinena, Diego; Baltaduonis, Rimvydas; Rentschler, Lucas - In: Experimental Economics 17 (2014) 1, pp. 100-128

In many auctions the valuation structure involves both private and common value elements. Existing experimental evidence (e.g. Goeree and Offerman in Am. Econ. Rev. 92(3):625–643, <CitationRef CitationID="CR12">2002</CitationRef>) demonstrates that first-price auctions with this valuation structure tend to be inefficient, and...</citationref>

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010989001

Initial Public Offerings of Ballplayers

Burger, John D.; Grayson, Richard D.; Walters, Stephen J.K. - International Association of Sport Economists - IASE; … - 2006

As a field study of choice under uncertainty, we examine baseball teams' investments in amateur players. Though most prospects fail to deliver any return on their multi-million dollar signing bonuses, returns on the minority who succeed easily offset these losses: the expected annual yield on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005731669

Does Competition for the Field Improve Cost Efficiency? Evidence from the London Bus Tendering Model

Amaral, Miguel; Saussier, Stéphane; Yvrande-Billon, Anne - Fachgebiet Wirtschafts- und Infrastukturpolitik (WIP), … - 2006

In this paper we investigate the relationship between auctions’ results and the number of bidders for local transportation contracts in London. Using an original database concerning 294 local transportation routes we find that a higher number of bidders is associated with a lower cost of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005162800

Number of Bidders and the Winner’s Curse in Toll Road Concessions: An Empirical Analysis

Athias, Laure; Nuñez, Antonio - Fachgebiet Wirtschafts- und Infrastukturpolitik (WIP), … - 2006

In this paper, we empirically assess the effects of the winner’s curse in auctions for road concession contracts. Such … investigate the overall effects of the winner’s curse on bidding behaviour in such auctions. Second, we examine the effects of the … winner’s curse on contract auctions with differing levels of common-value components. Third, we investigate how the winner’s …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005212647

What Determines the Interest Margin? An Analysis of the German Banking System

Buehn, Andreas; Karmann, Alexander; Pedrotti, Marco - In: Credit and Capital Markets 46 (2013) 4, pp. 467-494

which is particularly high for cooperative banks. The Winner’s Curse phenomenon and the cross-subsidization strategy …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010883583

Can position limits restrain ‘rogue’ trading?

ap Gwilym, Rhys; Ebrahim, M. Shahid - In: Journal of Banking & Finance 37 (2013) 3, pp. 824-836

This paper studies the imposition of position limits on commodity futures from the perspective of curbing excessive speculation and thus manipulation. We present a simple general equilibrium model in a static rational expectations framework and agent heterogeneity to illustrate that excessive...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010608682

Optimal Privatization Using Qualifying Auctions

boone, jan; Goeree, J.K. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2005

This paper explores the use of auctions for privatizing public assets.In our model, a single "insider" bidder (e.g. incumbent management of a government-owned firm) possesses information about the asset's risky value.In addition, bidders are privately informed about their costs of exploiting the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090655

Paying attention to payoffs in analogy-based learning

Miettinen, Topi - In: Economic Theory 50 (2012) 1, pp. 193-222

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010845605

Matching auction with winner’s curse and imperfect financial markets

Matros, Alexander - In: Economics Letters 115 (2012) 3, pp. 500-503

This paper explains how and why the Matching Auctions work better with Imperfect Financial Markets. We show that an efficient outsider can obtain a “good” project even if the insider has informational advantage.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011041778