Deviations from equilibrium predictions in one-shot games are common in experiments, and various models have been proposed to capture the behavior of boundedlyrational players in games. While the Quantal Response Equilibrium model allows players to better respond to correct beliefs, in the model...

Heifetz, Meier and Schipper (2013) introduced generalized extensive-form games that allow for asymmetric unawareness. Here, we study the normal form of a generalized extensiveform game. The generalized normal-form game associated to a generalized extensive-form game with unawareness may consist...

Chapter 1. Operations Management: A Curtain Raiser -- Chapter 2. Game Theory: Primitives and Representations -- Chapter 3. Games in Normal Form -- Chapter 4. Games in Normal Form: Applications in OM -- Chapter 5. Games in Extensive Form -- Chapter 6. Games in Extensive Form: Applications in OM...

This study examines how each player chooses her/his optimal action in "normal-form games with unawareness" by applying a "discovery process" to them. We show that if each player implements a best response to the opponents' immediately preceding plays, then any discovery process converges to a...

This paper develops a framework for estimating Quantal Response Equilibrium models from experimental data using Bayesian techniques. Bayesian techniques offer some advantages over the more commonly-used maximum likelihood approach: (i) the accuracy of the posterior simulation is limited by...

We study beliefs and choices in a repeated normal-form game. In addition to a baseline treatment with common knowledge of the game structure and feedback about choices in the previous period, we run treatments (i) without feedback about previous play, (ii) with no information about the...