This paper examines the effect of the benefits of corporate control to managers on the relationship between managerial … the acquiring firm increases, the interests of managers are more closely aligned with those of shareholders, reducing the … acquisition premium. At sufficiently high levels of managerial ownership, managers value a reduction in the risk of their …

Corporate managers who own a majority of the common stock in their company or who represent another firm owning such an … interest appear to be less constrained than managers of diffusely held firms, yet their power to harm minority shareholders …. Finally, there is little evidence that new organizational mechanisms have evolved to constrain managers who own large blocks …

Stock-based compensation is the standard solution to agency problems between shareholders and managers. In a dynamic … managers to work harder, it also induces them to hide any worsening of the firm's investment opportunities by following largely …-valued while managers hide the bad news to shareholders. We find that a firm-specific compensation package based on both stock and …

incentive to induce managers to pursue actions which increase the speculative component in the stock price. Our model provides a …

Large-scale increases in discrimination can lead to dismissals of highly qualified managers. We investigate how … expulsions of senior Jewish managers, due to rising discrimination in Nazi Germany, affected large corporations. Firms that lost … Jewish managers experienced persistent reductions in stock prices, dividends, and returns on assets. Aggregate market value …