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executive officers. However, firms are run by teams of managers, and a theory of the firm should also explain the distribution …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471450
: reducing the opportunity for managers to transfer value to equityholders from creditors via strategic default, and reducing the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012453649
This paper analyzes the links between corporate tax avoidance, the growth of high-powered incentives for managers, and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012468222
This paper develops new techniques for empirically analyzing demand and supply in differentiated products markets and then applies these techniques to analyze equilibrium in the U.S. automobile industry. Our primary goal is to present a framework which enables one to obtain estimates of demand...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012474698
We study the effect of physician incentives in an HMO network. Physician incentives are controversial because they may induce doctors to make treatment decisions that differ from those they would chose in the absence of incentives. We set out a theoretical framework for assessing the degree to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012470196
This paper investigates the individual and joint effects of group incentive pay and problem-solving teams on productivity. To estimate models of adoption of these work practices and models of the effects of the work practices on productivity, we constructed a data set on the operations of 34...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012470418
Empirical work testing for a negative tradeoff between risk and incentives, a cornerstone of agency theory, has not had …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012470935
This paper presents a market equilibrium model of CEO assignment, pay and incentives under risk aversion and heterogeneous moral hazard. Each of the three outcomes can be summarized by a single closed-form equation. In assignment models without moral hazard, allocation depends only on firm size...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012462666
The principal-agent model of executive compensation is of central importance to the modern theory of the firm and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012472176
When there is uncertainty about a CEO's quality, news about the firm causes rational investors to update their expectation of the firm's profitability for two reasons: Updates occur because of the direct effect of the news, and also because the news can cause an updated assessment of the CEO's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012459779