In the strategic investment under uncertainty literature the trade off between the value of waiting known from single decision maker models and the incentive to preempt competitors is mainly studied in duopoly models.This paper aims at studying competitive investments in new markets where more...

This paper considers the problem of investment timing under uncertainty in a duopoly framework.When both firms want to be the first investor a coordination problem arises.Here, a method is proposed to deal with this coordination problem, involving the use of symmetric mixed strategies.The method...

A cooperative game with transferable utility -or simply a TU-game- describes a situation in which players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation.A value function for these games is a function which assigns to every such a game a distribution of the payoffs over the players in the game.An...

We consider a firm's decision to replace an existing production technology with a new, more cost-efficient one.Kulatilaka and Perotti [1998, Management Science] nd that, in a two-period model, increased product market uncertainty could encourage the firm to invest strategically in the new...

AMS classification: 90D12;

We consider the problem of control of access to a firm's productive asset, embedding the decision makers into a structure of formal authority relationships.Within such a structure, decision makers act as principal to some decision makers, while they act as agent to other decision makers.We study...