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Career concerns, shareholder monitoring and investment efficiency : from the perspective of compensation contract rigidity in Chinese SOEs

Wan, Hualin; Zhu, Kai; Chen, Xinyuan - In: China journal of accounting research : CJAR 8 (2015) 1, pp. 59-73

This paper presents theoretical analysis of how career concerns and shareholder monitoring affect chief executive officer (CEO) agency costs. We investigate investment efficiency prior to CEO retirement based on a sample of Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) during the 1999-2007 period and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011844386

Complementarity and substitutability of managerial incentives : evidence from China's state-owned enterprises

Bai, Chong-En; Xu, Lixin Colin - 2000

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001546786

Managerial incentives and the organization of Chinese processing trade

Chen, Huiya; Swenson, Deborah - In: Asia-Pacific journal of accounting & economics : APJAE 17 (2010) 3, pp. 235-252

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008746915

Agency, firm growth, and managerial turnover : a Chinese study

Fu, Kangkang; Kwok, Wing Chun; Wong, George - In: Pacific-Basin finance journal 63 (2020), pp. 1-9

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012492172

The System of Incentives for CEOS with Multitasks : Theory and Evidence from Chinese State-Owned Enterprises

Bai, Chong-En; Xu, Lixin Colin - 2003

The multitask agency theory argues that incentive devices for the agent need to be viewed as a system to induce … theory and the literature on incomplete contracts …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014084983

A model of tournament incentives with corruption

Wang, Bin; Zheng, Yu - 2018

We provide a theory of how growth, corruption, and a low-powered public-sector pay scale coexist in a stable … a tournament, to address how a low-powered pay scale can effectively elicit effort in a tournament infested with …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011907238