Showing 1 - 7 of 7
We propose a theory of ex post inefficient renegotiation that is based on loss aversion. When two parties write a long-term contract that has to be renegotiated after the realization of the state of the world, they take the initial contract as a reference point to which they compare gains and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010583866
We propose a theory of ex post inefficient renegotiation that is based on loss aversion. When two parties write a long-term contract that has to be renegotiated after the realization of the state of the world, they take the initial contract as a reference point to which they compare gains and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010585795
In this paper it is argued that privatization is not the only alternative to public ownership. Adopting the incomplete contract approach, it is shown that partial privatization may well be the optimal ownership structure. While in the standard incomplete contract model joint ownership is usually...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005790035
We show that concerns for fairness may have dramatic consequences for the optimal provision of incentives in a moral hazard context. Incentive contracts that are optimal when there are only selfish actors become inferior when some agents are concerned about fairness. Conversely, contracts that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005649790
We report on several experiments on the optimal allocation of ownership rights. The experiments confirm the property rights approach by showing that the ownership structure affects relationship-specific investments and that subjects attain the most efficient ownership allocation despite starting...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005649818
Lecture on the first SFB/TR 15 meeting, Gummersbach, July, 18 - 20, 2004We report on several experiments on the optimal allocation of ownership rights. The experiments confirm the property rights approach by showing that the ownership structure affects relationship-specific investments and that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005739653
This article provides a non-technical survey on recent topics in the theory of contracts. The hold-up problem is presented and the incomplete contracts approach is discussed. Emphasis is put on conceptual problems and open questions that await further research.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005621420