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Executive compensation and stock options : an inconvenient truth
Danthine, Jean-Pierre; Donaldson, John B. - 2008
to be incompatible with the fact that the bulk of many high-proffile managers' compensation is in the form of various …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003961700
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Move a little closer? : information sharing and the spatial clustering of bank branches
Qi, Shusen; Haas, Ralph de; Ongena, Steven; Straetmans, … - 2018 - This version: 27 February 2018
We study how information sharing between banks influences the geographical clustering of branches. A spatial oligopoly …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011875705
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Director independence as strategic behavior
Wagner, Alexander F. (contributor) - 2007
This paper analyzes board independence and competence as distinct, but inextricably linked aspects of board effectiveness. Competent directors add shareholder value because they have better information about the quality of projects. While a CEO cares about shareholder value, he also wants his...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003550804
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Executive compensation : the view from general equilibrium
Danthine, Jean-Pierre (contributor);  … - 2007
firm to risk averse managers. The optimal contract has two main components: an incentive component corresponding to a non … and that maximizing the discounted sum of future dividends will be her objective. Linking managers' compensation to … overall economic performance is also required to make sure that managers use the appropriate stochastic discount factor to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003550864
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Why do U.S. CEOs pledge their own company's stock?
Fabisik, Kornelia - 2019
Between 2007 and 2016, 7.6% of publicly listed U.S. firms disclosed that their CEOs had pledged company stock as collateral for a loan. On average, CEOs pledge 38% of their shares. The mean loan value is an economically sizeable $65 million. CEOs use the funds to either double down (6.0%), hedge...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012134769
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Why are firms with more managerial ownership worth less?
Fabisik, Kornelia; Fahlenbrach, Rüdiger; Stulz, René M.; … - 2018
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011976932
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Straight talkers and vague talkers : the effects of managerial style in earnings conference calls
Dzielinski, Michal; Wagner, Alexander F.; Zeckhauser, … - 2017
Managers conducting earnings conference calls display distinctive styles in their word choice. Some CEOs and CFOs …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011665854
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Does protectionist anti-takeover legislation lead to managerial entrenchment?
Frattaroli, Marc - 2018
I study a protectionist anti-takeover law introduced in 2014 that covers a subset of all firms in the economy. The law decreased affected firms' likelihood of becoming the target of a merger or acquisition and had a negative impact on shareholder value. There is no evidence that management of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011875653
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Earnings management and managerial compensation
Bachmann, Kremena; Hens, Thorsten - 2017
This paper studies the earnings management behavior of a manager in a strategic game in which the manager may have incentives to avoid earnings below the analysts' consensus forecast and the analysts aiming to provide accurate forecasts behave as rational Bayesians. Our analysis reveals the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011875852
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Earning investor trust : the role of past earnings management
Eugster, Florian; Wagner, Alexander F. - 2018
, this effect occurs in industries where investor trust has recently been violated, and where managers would in the past have …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011865525