assign a non-profit-maximization objective to their managers. Consequently, managers in a delegation game invest more in cost …

still benefits from the increase in the merged firm's total value. Moreover, given that the managers are compensated … according to an identical linear incentive scheme, the optimal shareholder policy always entails a corner solution. Managers …

assign a non-profit-maximization objective to their managers. Consequently, managers in a delegation game invest more in cost …

combination of profits and sales as incentives for their managers. On the second stage, the two managers compete in a tournament …This paper considers a two-stage game with two owners and two managers. On the first stage, the owners choose a linear … against each other. In a symmetric equilibrium, both owners induce their managers to maximize profits. In asymmetric …

the unverifiability problem of labor contracts. Under a zero-profit condition, both tournament types will yield first … all the bargaining power. However, if workers are rik averse or one worker has a lead a J-type tournament may dominate a U …-type tournament. …

The paper presents the concept of an imitation equilibrium and explores it in the context of some simple oligopoly …

We develop a product market theory that explains why firms invest in general training of their workers. We consider a …

This paper derives a three stage Cournot-oligopoly game for product innovation, expenditure on introducing the product …