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Local agency costs of political centralization

Myerson, Roger B. - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 2, pp. 425-448

We analyze a model of moral hazard in local public services which could be efficiently managed by officials under local democratic accountability, but not by officials who are appointed by the ruler of a centralized autocracy. The ruler might prefer to retain an official who diverted resources...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012587346

Hierarchy and information

Rogger, Daniel; Somani, Ravi - 2018

What determines the distribution of information acquired within the hierarchy of a public organization? Without market processes, the generation and absorption of information in bureaucracy relies on individual actors undertaking costly action to acquire it. This paper reports on comparisons...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012002337

Maskin meets Abreu and Matsushima

Chen, Yi-chun; Kunimoto, Takashi; Sun, Yifei; Xiong, Siyang - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 17 (2022) 4, pp. 1683-1717

The theory of full implementation has been criticized for using integer/modulo games, which admit no equilibrium …-established but somewhat orthogonal approaches in full implementation theory. We show that Maskin monotonicity is a necessary and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013472500

Cities drifting apart : heterogeneous outcomes of decentralizing public education

Brutti, Zelda - In: IZA Journal of Labor Economics 9 (2020) 1/3, pp. 1-38

before decentralization was implemented, even when looking within different local development ranges. Based on the analysis …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012242139

The construction of national identities

Almagro, Milena; Andrés-Cerezo, David - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 15 (2020) 2, pp. 763-810

steady states and extreme levels of (de)centralization. We also find the ability to foster a common identity is highly …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012308623

Backup agreement as a coordination mechanism in a decentralized fruit chain in a developing country

Rojas Palacios, Margy Nathalia; Peña Orozco, Diego León; … - In: Games 13 (2022) 3, pp. 1-18

This paper aims to analyze the impacts of a backup agreement contract on the performance of a small agricultural producers' citrus supply chain. A backup agreement contract, which ensures for each echelon that a quantity of products will be bought independently of real demand, is proposed to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013252732

Developing dimensions and indicators to measure decentralization in decentralized autonomous organizations

Park, Hyejin; Ureta, Ivan; Kim, Bo-Young - In: Administrative Sciences : open access journal 13 (2023) 11, pp. 1-15

Decentralization holds a significant role in the context of decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs), with its … nature being not a fixed value but a comparative spectrum. Prior research investigating the measurement of decentralization … to define dimensions and indicators, tailored explicitly for assessing decentralization levels within DAOs. Then, the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014449871

Optimal information disclosure and market outcomes

Hopenhayn, Hugo Andrés; Saeedi, Maryam - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 18 (2023) 4, pp. 1317-1344

This paper addresses two central questions in markets with adverse selection: How does information impact the welfare of market participants (sellers and buyers)? Also, what is the optimal information disclosure policy and how is it affected by the planner's relative welfare weight on sellers'...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014440060

Quid pro quo : friendly information exchange between rivals

Blume, Andreas; Park, In-Uck - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 17 (2022) 3, pp. 1183-1223

We show that information exchange via disclosure is possible in equilibrium even when it is certain that whenever one party learns the truth, the other loses. The incentive to disclose results either from an expectation of disclosure being reciprocated - the quid pro quo motive - or from the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013327121

Value-based distance between information structures

Gensbittel, Fabien; Pęski, Marcin; Renault, Jérôme - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 17 (2022) 3, pp. 1225-1267

We define the distance between two information structures as the largest possible difference in value across all zero-sum games. We provide a tractable characterization of distance and use it to discuss the relation between the value of information in games versus single-agent problems, the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013327123