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multiplicative separability condition, the optimal mechanism offers a single contract. This condition holds, for example, when output … likelihood ratio property, the mechanism offers a single debt contract. Our results generalize if the output distribution is … “close” to multiplicatively separable. Our model suggests that offering a single contract may be optimal in environments with …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013327130
We consider a dynamic principal-agent problem, where the sole instrument the principal has to incentivize the agent is the disclosure of information. The principal aims at maximizing the (discounted) number of times the agent chooses the principal's preferred action. We show that there exists an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014576723
. An analyst is uncertain about what actions are available and evaluates a contract by the expected payoffs it guarantees …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014440091
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009726270
, we exploit an exogenous change in the contract structure in 2003, the piece rate increasing from 20.2 to 22.9 euros. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012202372
specific game-theoretic models (an observable-contract game and an unobservable-contract game), we find two key results: (i …) The unobservability of a contract may increase inefficiency of the environmental conflict in terms of legal efforts …; however, (ii) the unobservability of a contract may increase the fairness of the outcome in terms of the plaintiff …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014426341
Motivated by markets for ''expertise,'' we study a bandit model where a principal chooses between a safe and risky arm. A strategic agent controls the risky arm and privately knows whether its type is high or low. Irrespective of type, the agent wants to maximize duration of experimentation with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013273779
We study the delegation problem between a principal and an agent, who not only has better information about the performance of the available actions but also superior awareness of the set of actions that are actually feasible. We provide conditions under which the agent finds it optimal to leave...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014468074
I study whether self-fulfilling bank runs can occur when banks use sophisticated contracts and withdrawal decisions are public information. In a finite-agent version of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) with correlated types, I first present an example in which a bank run perfect Bayesian equilibrium...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014468076
optimally offers a contract that makes the agent's utility concave in output. If the agent is risk-neutral and protected by … concavity constraint might bind for some outputs but not others. We characterize the unique profit-maximizing contract and show …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012308620