The Nash program is an important research agenda initiated in Nash (Econometrica 21:128-140, 1953) in order to bridge the gap between the noncooperative and cooperative counterparts of game theory. The program is thus turning sixty-seven years old, but I will argue it is not ready for...

The value is a solution concept for n-person strategic games, developed by Nash, Shapley, and Harsanyi. The value of a game is an a priori evaluation of the economic worth of the position of each player, reflecting the players' strategic possibilities, including their ability to make threats...

We report an experiment designed to study bargaining behavior between one buyer and multiple sellers with complementarity and how it is influenced by fairness concern and information transparency. We base our setup on a structured alternating-offer bargaining model in which a buyer procures...

We analyze a dynamic bargaining game where parties can agree to implement a policy change, which is costly (beneficial) in the short-run but beneficial (costly) in the long-run. When the status-quo is endogenized (at least in some components), we show that the more farsighted party can induce...

We explore mechanism design with outcome-based social preferences. Agents' social preferences and private payoffs are all subject to asymmetric information. We assume quasi-linear utility and independent types. We show how the asymmetry of information about agents' social preferences can be...

In this article we combine Debreu's (1952) social system with Hurwicz's (1994, 2008) ideas of embedding a "desired" game form into a "natural" game form that includes all feasible behavior, even if it is "illegal" according to the desired form. For the resulting socio-legal system we extend...

This study examines a supply chain consisting of a capital-constrained supplier and a retailer. The supplier sells wholesale products to consumers through the retailer and may also sell directly to consumers via an online channel. Given that the supplier's initial working capital may be...

Why do some incomplete information markets feature intermediaries while others do not? I study the allocation of two goods in an incomplete information setting with a single principal, multiple agents with unit demand, and interdependent valuations. I construct a novel dynamic mechanism...

This note reconsiders the Rubinstein bargaining game under the assumption that a rejected offer is only costly to the proposer who made the rejected offer. It is shown that then, the classic result of Shaked that, in the multilateral version of this game, every division of the good can be...

This work aims to provide different perspectives on the relationships between cooperative game theory and the research field concerning climate change dynamics. New results are obtained in the framework of competitive bargaining solutions and related issues, moving from a cooperative approach to...