This study investigates the strategic decisions of online platform retailers (OPRs) within government-regulated digital marketplaces, focusing on India's Open Network for Digital Commerce (ONDC). The ONDC initiative, aimed at democratizing e-commerce, presents both challenges and opportunities...

We consider a platform which provides probabilistic forecasts to a customer using some algorithm. We introduce a concept of miscalibration, which measures the discrepancy between the forecast and the truth. We characterize the platform's optimal equilibrium when it incurs some cost for...

The area of online investing is reshaping the financial industry through the emergence of numerous new providers with innovative concepts. This has led to new challenges for customers, such as how to assess the reliability and trustworthiness of the new providers and their offers. This...

We propose a theoretical model in which uninformed consumers update their beliefs about the health effects of sugar in soft drinks through two sequential policies: an information campaign and a sugar tax. The information campaign is modeled as a costless signal (cheap talk), while the tax policy...

I study a repeated game in which a patient player wants to win the trust of some myopic opponents but can strictly benefit from betraying them. His benefit from betrayal is strictly positive and is his persistent private information. I characterize every type of patient player's highest...

Motivated by markets for ''expertise,'' we study a bandit model where a principal chooses between a safe and risky arm. A strategic agent controls the risky arm and privately knows whether its type is high or low. Irrespective of type, the agent wants to maximize duration of experimentation with...

This paper studies sequential Bayesian persuasion games with multiple senders. We provide a tractable characterization of equilibrium outcomes. We apply the model to study how the structure of consultations affects information revelation. Adding a sender who moves first cannot reduce...

We consider a Bayesian persuasion problem where a sender's utility depends only on the expected state. We show that upper censorship that pools the states above a cutoff and reveals the states below the cutoff is optimal for all prior distributions of the state if and only if the sender's...

We present a unified duality approach to Bayesian persuasion. The optimal dual variable, interpreted as a price function on the state space, is shown to be a supergradient of the concave closure of the objective function at the prior belief. Strong duality holds when the objective function is...