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Sixty-seven years of the Nash program : time for retirement?

Serrano, Roberto - In: SERIEs : Journal of the Spanish Economic Association 12 (2021) 1, pp. 35-48

The Nash program is an important research agenda initiated in Nash (Econometrica 21:128-140, 1953) in order to bridge the gap between the noncooperative and cooperative counterparts of game theory. The program is thus turning sixty-seven years old, but I will argue it is not ready for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012503895

Fairness and transparency in one-to-many bargaining with complementarity : an experimental study

Mak, Vincent; Zwick, Rami - In: Games 15 (2024) 4, pp. 1-29

We report an experiment designed to study bargaining behavior between one buyer and multiple sellers with … alternating-offer bargaining model in which a buyer procures complementary items from two heterogeneous sellers with endogenous … choice of the order of bargaining. In addition, we implemented an information transparency manipulation regarding whether the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015073214

Socio-legal systems and implementation of the Nash solution in Debreu-Hurwicz equilibrium

Haake, Claus-Jochen; Trockel, Walter - 2021 - This version: April 05, 2021

these new concepts via an application in the narrow welfarist framework of two person cooperative bargaining. There we … provide in a socio-legal system based on Nash's demand game an implementation of the Nash bargaining solution in Debreu …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012499554

The role of the status-quo in dynamic bargaining

Flamini, Francesca - In: Games 14 (2023) 3, pp. 1-20

We analyze a dynamic bargaining game where parties can agree to implement a policy change, which is costly (beneficial …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014422522

Cooperative strategic games

Kohlberg, Elon; Neyman, Abraham - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 3, pp. 825-851

The value is a solution concept for n-person strategic games, developed by Nash, Shapley, and Harsanyi. The value of a game is an a priori evaluation of the economic worth of the position of each player, reflecting the players' strategic possibilities, including their ability to make threats...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012806287

Time-inconsistent bargaining and cross-commitments

Utset, Manuel A. - In: Games 14 (2023) 3, pp. 1-21

The paper studies bargaining games involving players with present-biased preferences. The paper shows that the relative … timing of bargaining rewards and bargaining costs will determine whether the players' present-bias will affect bargaining … outcomes. In cases where players agree to a bargain in period 1 and experience all bargaining payoffs in period 2, the players …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014422534

Renegotiation of long‐term contracts as part of an implicit agreement

Kostadinov, Rumen - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 4, pp. 1471-1512

I study a repeated principal-agent game with long‐term output contracts that can be renegotiated at will. Actions are observable but not contractible, so they can only be incentivized through implicit agreements formed in equilibrium. I show that contract renegotiation is a powerful tool for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012806553

Efficient incentives with social preferences

Daske, Thomas; March, Christoph - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 19 (2024) 3, pp. 975-999

We explore mechanism design with outcome-based social preferences. Agents' social preferences and private payoffs are all subject to asymmetric information. We assume quasi-linear utility and independent types. We show how the asymmetry of information about agents' social preferences can be...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014635255

On bargaining norms as solutions to cost-minimization problems

Tatur, Tymon - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 19 (2024) 4, pp. 1443-1472

This paper studies bargaining outcomes in economies in which agents may be able to impose outcomes that deviate from … the relevant social norms but incur costs when they do so. It characterizes bargaining outcomes that are easiest for a … approach yields the Nash bargaining solution, the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, the equal monetary split, and other bargaining …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015135347

Umweltressourcen als Gegenstand internationaler Verhandlungen : eine theoretische Transaktionskostenanalyse

Kuhl, Heiner - 1987

Umweltsysteme wie die Atmosphäre, Flüsse, Seen und Meere machen vor nationalen Grenzen nicht halt. Das wird in Europa besonders deutlich. Daher treten eine Vielzahl grenzüberschreitender Umweltallokationsprobleme auf. Aufgrund der nationalen Souveränitätsrechte lassen sich diese Probleme...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011920966