We consider a general framework of optimal contract design under the heterogeneity and short-termism of agents. Our research shows that the optimal contract must weigh the agent's information rent, incentive cost, and benefit to overcome the contract's adverse selection and moral hazards. Agents...

We show that Bayesian posteriors concentrate on the outcome distributions that approximately minimize the Kullback–Leibler divergence from the empirical distribution, uniformly over sample paths, even when the prior does not have full support. This generalizes Diaconis and Freedman's (1990)...

Most factor-based forecasting models for the term structure of interest rates depend on a fixed number of factor loading functions that have to be specified in advance. In this study, we relax this assumption by building a yield curve forecasting model that learns new factor decompositions...

This paper estimates a standard Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model that includes a wage and price Phillips curves with different expectation formation processes for Brazil and the USA. Other than the standard rational expectation process, we also use a limited rationality...

Belief‐updating biases hinder the correction of inaccurate beliefs and lead to suboptimal decisions. We complement Rabin and Schrag's (1999) portable extension of the Bayesian model by including conservatism in addition to confirmatory bias. Additionally, we show how to identify these two...

This paper studies sequential Bayesian persuasion games with multiple senders. We provide a tractable characterization of equilibrium outcomes. We apply the model to study how the structure of consultations affects information revelation. Adding a sender who moves first cannot reduce...

A sender designs an information structure to persuade a receiver to take an action. The sender is ignorant about the receiver's prior, and evaluates each information structure using the receiver's prior that is the worst for the sender. I characterize the optimal information structures in this...

We present a unified duality approach to Bayesian persuasion. The optimal dual variable, interpreted as a price function on the state space, is shown to be a supergradient of the concave closure of the objective function at the prior belief. Strong duality holds when the objective function is...

Mean-preserving contractions are critical for studying Bayesian models of information design. We introduce the class of bi-pooling policies, and the class of bi-pooling distributions as their induced distributions over posteriors. We show that every extreme point in the set of all...

We consider a Bayesian persuasion problem where a sender's utility depends only on the expected state. We show that upper censorship that pools the states above a cutoff and reveals the states below the cutoff is optimal for all prior distributions of the state if and only if the sender's...