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Contracting over persistent information
Zhao, Wei; Mezzetti, Claudio; Renou, Ludovic; Tomala, … - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 19 (2024) 2, pp. 917-974
the disclosure of information. The principal aims at maximizing the (discounted) number of times the agent chooses the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014576723
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The provision of wage incentives : A structural estimation using contracts variation
D'Haultfœuille, Xavier; Février, Philippe - In: Quantitative economics : QE ; journal of the … 11 (2020) 1, pp. 349-397
, we exploit an exogenous change in the contract structure in 2003, the piece rate increasing from 20.2 to 22.9 euros. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012202372
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Optimal contracts with a risk-taking agent
Barron, Daniel; Georgiadis, George; Swinkels, Jeroen M. - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 15 (2020) 2, pp. 715-761
optimally offers a contract that makes the agent's utility concave in output. If the agent is risk-neutral and protected by … concavity constraint might bind for some outputs but not others. We characterize the unique profit-maximizing contract and show …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012308620
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Renegotiation of long‐term contracts as part of an implicit agreement
Kostadinov, Rumen - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 4, pp. 1471-1512
contract renegotiation is a powerful tool for incentive provision, despite the stationarity of the environment. Continuation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012806553
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Robust relational contracts with subjective performance evaluation
Bhaskar, V.; Olszewski, Wojciech; Wiseman, Thomas - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 19 (2024) 3, pp. 1027-1055
We study a repeated principal-agent model with transferable utility, where the principal's evaluation of the agent …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014635277
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Dynamic contracting with limited commitment and the ratchet effect
Gerardi, Dino; Maestri, Lucas Jóver - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 15 (2020) 2, pp. 583-623
low, the firm offers a pooling contract and no information is ever revealed. In contrast, if this prior probability is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012308452
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Vertical relationships with hidden interactions
Kim, Jaesoo; Shin, Dongsoo - In: Games 14 (2023) 6, pp. 1-21
In an agency model with adverse selection, we study how hidden interactions between agents affect the optimal contract …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014443301
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(Bad) reputation in relational contracting
Deb, Rahul; Mitchell, Matthew F.; Pai, Mallesh M. - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 17 (2022) 2, pp. 763-800
Motivated by markets for ''expertise,'' we study a bandit model where a principal chooses between a safe and risky arm. A strategic agent controls the risky arm and privately knows whether its type is high or low. Irrespective of type, the agent wants to maximize duration of experimentation with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013273779
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Incentive contracts when agents distort probabilities
Gonzalez Jimenez, Victor H. - In: Quantitative economics : QE ; journal of the … 15 (2024) 3, pp. 607-653
prevent the accurate evaluation of probabilities-account for this finding. The results highlight the limits of contracts …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015053193
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Relational communication
Kolotilin, Anton; Li, Hongyi - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 4, pp. 1391-1430
We study a communication game between an informed sender and an uninformed receiver with repeated interactions and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012806596