We present a simple model where, before competing in prices, firms announce which prices they intend to choose. Deviating from these announcements involves a cost. We show that sharing pricing intentions results in prices being set above their competitive levels. All equilibria result in prices...

Our paper deals with empirical and technical problems to derive (conventional) cost functions in banks and other financial institutions. One main reason is based on the still ongoing discussion on inputs and outputs of financial intermediaries. A second obstacle is due to the fact that most of...

In this paper, a theoretical relationship is obtained to measure the effect that inefficiency has on marginal costs, degree of economies of scale and technical change. It is shown that when the relationship between inefficiency and output level is ignored, the estimation of marginal costs and...

The purpose of this study is to investigate regional differences in the business characteristics of Japanese agricultural cooperatives (JAs), which have been widely criticized for depending on non-agricultural activities, contradictory to cooperative principles. We construct a panel data set...

This paper generalizes the concept of Bayes' correlated equilibrium Bergemann and Morris (2016) to multistage games. We apply our characterization results to a number of illustrative examples and applications.

Harris, Reny, and Robson (1995) added a public randomization device to dynamic games with almost perfect information to ensure existence of subgame perfect equilibria (SPE). We show that when Nature's moves are atomless in the original game, public randomization does not enlarge the set of SPE...

This paper aims to solve two fundamental problems on finite or infinite horizon dynamic games with complete information. Under some mild conditions, we prove the existence of subgame-perfect equilibria and the upper hemicontinuity of equilibrium payoffs in general dynamic games with simultaneous...

We investigate the role and performance of imitative behavior in a class of quantity-setting, Cournot games. Within a framework of evolutionary competition between rational, myopic best-response and imitation heuristics with differential heuristics' costs, we found that the equilibrium stability...

We present a new approach to studying equilibrium dynamics in a class of stochastic games with a continuum of players with private types and strategic complementarities. We introduce a suitable equilibrium concept, called Markov Stationary Nash Distributional Equilibrium (MSNDE), prove its...

We consider a dynamic game with asymmetric information where each player privately observes a noisy version of a (hidden) state of the world V, resulting in dependent private observations. We study the structured perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBEs) that use private beliefs in their strategies as...