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contract renegotiation is a powerful tool for incentive provision, despite the stationarity of the environment. Continuation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012806553
agent wants to maximize duration of experimentation with the risky arm. However, only the high type arm can generate value …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013273779
We study a repeated principal-agent model with transferable utility, where the principal's evaluation of the agent's performance is subjective. Our focus is on equilibria which are robust to the addition of small privately observed shocks to the payoffs. Existing constructions of positive-effort...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014635277
specific game-theoretic models (an observable-contract game and an unobservable-contract game), we find two key results: (i …) The unobservability of a contract may increase inefficiency of the environmental conflict in terms of legal efforts …; however, (ii) the unobservability of a contract may increase the fairness of the outcome in terms of the plaintiff …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014426341
contract modifications but not the hazard rate of a head coach's dismissal. Additionally, analysis of employment duration … employment survival, these studies ignore the impact of contract modifications. Using an accelerated failure time survival model … with hand-collected college head football coach contract data, I find that race/ethnicity affects the hazard rate of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015326318
important aspect of the supplier-buyer relationship is the contract duration, and how this factor is likely to affect firm …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012264923
belief that market actors adhere to informal contract arrangements. Particularly in lower-income countries, which are often … described by distortions - such as inefficient institutions (e.g., contract enforcement), imperfect markets (e.g., access to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014474639
A principal incentivizes an agent to maintain compliance and to truthfully announce any breaches of compliance. Compliance is imperfectly controlled by the agent's private effort choices, is partially persistent, and is verifiable by the principal only through costly inspections. We show that in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014576718
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008903123
Competition is a core feature of science and has for some time also been viewed by institutions in the higher education sector, as well as the state, as an incentive to produce scientific output. Due to scarce financial resources third-party funding plays an increasingly important role. However,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014230969