-maker. We derive the researcher's equilibrium learning strategy by solving an auxiliary single-player problem. The attribute … excessive response to new information, she forgoes learning altogether. In an organizational context, we show that a manager …

Social learning often occurs between groups with different levels of experience. Yet little is known about the ideal … novices learning from experienced, a particular form of probabilistic imitation is selected. Novices should imitate any …

We build a model studying the effect of an economy's potential for social learning on the adoption of innovations of … qualitative and quantitative features of the learning environment affect equilibrium adoption dynamics, welfare, and the speed of … learning. Based on this, we show how differences in the learning environment translate into observable differences in adoption …

We propose a framework in order to econometrically estimate case-based learning and apply it to empirical data from … twelve 2 × 2 mixed strategy equilibria experiments. Case-based learning allows agents to explicitly incorporate information …-based learning to other learning models (reinforcement learning and self-tuned experience weighted attraction learning) while using …

voting patterns, shocks to electoral competition induced by exogenous redistricting of villages resulted in upper …

Learning is crucial to organizational decision making but often needs to be delegated. We examine a dynamic delegation … the principal, privately learns the profitability over time and communicates to the principal. We formulate learning … delegation as a dynamic mechanism design problem and characterize the optimal delegation scheme. We show that private learning …

While payoff-based learning models are almost exclusively devised for finite action games, where players can test every … action, it is harder to design such learning processes for continuous games. We construct a stochastic learning rule …

We study a sequential-learning model featuring a network of naive agents with Gaussian information structures. Agents … disproportionately influential early agents who can cause herding on incorrect actions. Going beyond existing social-learning results, we …