We examine a bargaining game in which players cannot make arbitrary offers. Instead, players alternately decide whether to accept or delay, and are rewarded with an indivisible portion and a perishable transfer that depends on the round. Our analysis demonstrates that when the initial transfer...

Umweltsysteme wie die Atmosphäre, Flüsse, Seen und Meere machen vor nationalen Grenzen nicht halt. Das wird in Europa besonders deutlich. Daher treten eine Vielzahl grenzüberschreitender Umweltallokationsprobleme auf. Aufgrund der nationalen Souveränitätsrechte lassen sich diese Probleme...

This note reconsiders the Rubinstein bargaining game under the assumption that a rejected offer is only costly to the proposer who made the rejected offer. It is shown that then, the classic result of Shaked that, in the multilateral version of this game, every division of the good can be...

For product supply chains, contractual relationships that provide win-win outcomes between the supply chain members, have been found to offer optimum results. However, for bargaining situations where time/cost is the source of the uncertainty, i.e. projects, there is limited knowledge available...