We investigate why a firm might purposefully hire a chief executive officer (CEO) who under- or over-estimates the degree of substitutability between competing products. This counterintuitive result arises in imperfect competition because CEO bias can affect rival behavior and the intensity of...

An owner of a firm may choose to hire an unbiased CEO or one with confidence bias. We develop a model that demonstrates that the owner's optimal choice depends on whether the firm and rival choice variables are strategic substitutes or strategic complements. When choice variables are strategic...

We contribute to the debate on the spatial allocation of infrastructure investments by examining where these investments generate the highest economic return (‘spatial efficiency’), and identifying trade-offs when infrastructure coverage is made more equitable across regions (‘spatial...

In many countries, place specific investments in infrastructure are viewed as integral components of territorial development policies. But are these policies fighting market forces of concentration? Or are they adding net value to the national economy by tapping underexploited resources? This...